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COURTS - EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - INJUNCTION I N N O R T H
DAKOTA. - Justice Story has described injunction as "a judicial pro-
cess whereby a party is required to do a particular thing, or to re-
frain from doing a particular thing according to the exigency of the
writ."' Spelling, in discussing the office of the writ, has pointed
out that courts of equity would possess little power without its aid
and has stated that the writ "may be appropriately termed the
strong arm of the courts of equity."2 The writ's important function
is the placing of a restraint on the party subject to it, thereby main-
taining the "status quo". The great number of cases involving in-
junction in North Dakota indicate its importance in solving legal
disputes.
Historically speaking, the remedy of injunction was not one of
the prerogative writs. The common law prerogative writs were
jurisdictional writs, while injunction was an equitable remedy.
Early equity courts required in most cases that jurisdiction be main-
tained on' other grounds and would issue an injunction only after
bill or information was filed. 3 In interpreting the provisions for in-
junctive relief provided in the North Dakota Constitution, the
Supreme Court has termed the writ quasi-prerogative and has
stated that the writ may be issued by the Supreme Court as readily
as the other prerogative writs.'
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Original jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction was conferred
upon the Supreme Court' and the district courts by the state con-
stitution.6 The North Dakota Supreme Court was called upon to
clarify the original jurisdiction conferred upon it in an early case
involving injunction.7 The court stated that the intention of the
constitutional grants of original jurisdiction in both the Supreme
Court and district courts was to confer upon the district courts,
which are readily accessible, original cognizance of all ordinary
cases and to confer upon the Supreme Court in its discretion origi-
nal cognizance in a limited number of cases.8 The requisites for
original cognizance were stated to be: (1) Leave to file an in-
formation must be obtained by the Attorney General. (2) If the
1. 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence § 861 (13th ed. 1886).
2. 1 Spelling, Injunction and Other Extraordinary Remedies, 3 (2nd ed. 1901).
3. Attorney General v. Chicago & N. W. RR., 35 Wis. 425, 513 (1874).
4. State ex rel. Moore v. Archibald, 5 N. D. 359, 363, 66 N.W. 234, 236 (1896)
(dictum).
5. N. D. Const., art 4, 8 87.
6. N. D. Const., art. 4, § 103.
7. State v. Nelson County, 1 N. D. 88, 45 N.W. 33 (1890).
8. Id. at 101, 45 N.W. at 38.
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information made out a prima-facie case the writ would issue in
cases "publici-juris" and those affecting the sovereignty of the state,
its franchises and prerogative, or the liberties of the people. The
court was careful to point out that the granting of the writ remain-
ed discretionaryY Before original jurisdiction will attach" the sov-
ereign power of the state must be directly involved (i. e. as opposed
to collaterally). 10 The Supreme Court has recognized that a case
may possibly arise where the court would allow a private relator to
bring a suit without the permission of the Attorney General."
The constitutional provisions and subsequent court decisions have
established the Supreme Court's power to grant writs of injunction,
not only in aid of its appellate 12 and superintending jurisdiction, 1
but originally when the necessary prerequisites are present.1"
JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURTS
The North Dakota Supreme Court has also defined the extent of
original jurisdiction conferred upon the district courts. The court,
speaking of prerogative writs in general, said: "as a means of insti-
tuting private litigation the inferior courts of original jurisdiction
have and should have, exclusive power to use them."'15 The consti-
tutional provisions conferring jurisdiction in the district courts to
grant injunctive relief have been further defined by statute.1" The
remedy of injunction has been designated by statute to be used in
aid of other judicial remedies.17
GENERAL APPLICATION OF INJUNCTION
The use of injunction in specific cases is beyond the scope of this
note. The situations in which it is used are almost infinite. In North
Dakota injunction cannot be used to establish title and ownership
in real property"8 but it can be used to prevent a threatened dis-
tuirbance of the peaceful use and enjoyment of real property. 9
While as a general rule if the legal remedy is adequate no injunc-
9. Ibid.
10. State ex rel. Moore v. Archibald, 5 N.D. 359, 66 N.W. 234 (1896) (The court
was speaking of prerogative writs in general).
11. See State ex rel. Byrne v. Wilcox, 11 N. D. 329, 335, 91 N.W. 955, 959 (1902).
12. N. D. Const. art. 4, § 86; State v. Nelson County, 1 N. D. 88, 101, 45 N.W. 33,
37 (1890) (dictum).
13. N. D. Const. art. 4, § 86; State ex rel. Lemke v. District Court, 49 N. D. 27, 186
N.W. 381 (1921).
14. State v. Nelson County, 1 N. D. 88, 101, 45 N.W. 33, 38, (1890).
15. State ex rel. Moore v. Archibald, 5 N. D. 359, 373, 66 N.W. 234, 240, (1896).
16. N. D. Rev. Code c. 32-05; N. D. Rev. Code c. 32-06.
17. E.g., N. D. Rev. Code § 28-2908 (1943) (mortgage foreclosure); N. D. Rev.
Code § 32-1806 (1943) (cancellation of land contracts); N. D. Rev. Code § 35-2204
(1943) (foreclosure by advertisement); N. D. Rev. Code § 35-2302 (1943) (foreclosure
on personal property).
18. Farmers Union Oil Co. v. Kilgore, 71 N.D. 199, 299 N.W. 318 (1941).
19. Gunsch v. Gunsch, 69 N.W.2d 739 (N. D. 1954).
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tion will be granted, injunction may be obtained to prevent a con-
tinuous series of trespasses even though a legal remedy may be
adequate for a single trespass..2 1 Violation of a contract not to re-
engage in business has been enjoined.2 t Injunction has been used
to test the validity of a statute as well as the extent of authority
which such statute may confer on an official charged with its execu-
t.on.2 2 In North Dakota it appears that the remedies of mandamus
md injunction are complimentary with respect to their use in en-
forcing "ministerial" duties of public officers, mandamus being used
to compel action and injunction to restrain unauthorized acts..2'
Injunction has been used to prevent an invalid attempt at annexing
territory adjacent to a city2 and where an official attempted to sub-
mit a proposed amendment not in the required form he was en-
joined.22  Generally an injunction cannot be had to restrain the
commission of a crime, but where there is an actual interference or
imminent threat of interference with some public or private legal
right, which would result in irreparable damages, injunction may
be used.2 1 While mandatory injunctions are not favored, if preven-
tive relief is not adequate, mandatory injunction will be used to
iestore the "status quo". -7
NATURE AND REQUISITES OF THE REMEDY
In order to secure injunctive relief the plaintiff must establish
some actual, threatened or irreparable injury to his rights.2- Irre-
parable in this sense does not mean that the injury is beyond repair
or compensation for damages, but rather that it must be of such
constant and frequent occurrence, that the injured party cannot be
adequately compensated for any damages, or that the resulting
damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard
but only by conjecture.2 9 No injunctive relief will be granted where
a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law is available. "- The
granting of a temporary or final injunction is a matter wholly within
20. Bartels Northern Oil Co. v. Jackman, 29 N. D. 236, 150 N.W. 576 (1915).
21. Hanson v. Wirtz, 52 N. D. 604, 204 N.W. 672 (1925).
22. Bartels Northern Oil Co. v. Jackman, 29 N. D. 236, 150 N.W. 576 (1915).
23. See State ex rel. Linde v. Hall, 35 N. D. 34, 65, 159 N.W. 281, 294 (1916).
24. Red River Valley Brick Co. v. Grand Forks, 27 N. D. 8, 145 N.W. 725 (1914).
25. State ex rel. Linde v. Hall, 35 N. D. 34, 159 N.W. 281 (1916).
26. E.g., Richmond v. Miller, 70 N. D. 157, 292 N.W. 633 (1940).
27. Viestenz v. Arthur Township, 78 N. D. 1029, 54 N.W.2d 572 (1952).
28. McIntyre v. State Board of Higher Education, 71 N. D. 630, 3 N.W.2d 463
(1942).
29. Bartels Northern Oil Co. v. Jackman, 29 N. D. 236, 150 N.W. 576 (1915).
30. Continental Hose Co. v. Mitchell, 15 N. D. 144, 105 N.W. 1108 (1906).
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the discretion of the trial court.:1 The remedy has been character-
ized as being summary, peculiar, and extraordinary. 
:
TEMPORARY INJUNCTIONS
Temporary injunctive relief is provided for by statute in North
Dakota. :13 "The injunction may be granted at the time of commenc-
ing the action, or at any time afterwards before judgment, upon its
ippearing satisfactorily to the court or judge, by the affidavit of the
plaintiff, or any other person, that sufficient grounds exist there-
for."' 4 When the conditions as set out in the statute have been
cstablished a temporary injunction will be granted, but only when
it shall appear by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the
relief demanded."' The statute has vested in the trial court dis-
cretionary power to determine in the first instance whether relief
should be granted and the exercise of such discretion will not be
reversed or controlled by the Supreme Court except for error or
abuse."'
The provisional remedy provided by statute, is granted to protect
the plaintiff's rights 7 and can be issued only in a pending action or
special proceeding. :1' Therefore, where the action is no longer pend-
ing, the judgment having become final, and no motion is made to
vacate or satisfy the judgment, the defendant cannot get an injunc-
tion in the action in which the judgment was rendered."
The defendant in a civil action is not entitled to the provisional
remedies of injunction.4" The statute gives the court the power to
grant a temporary injunction exparte and the question of whether
a hearing shall be had prior to such granting is within the court's
discretion."
The statute also provides that restraining orders may issue ex-
parte or without a hearing, but restricts their use to occasions re-
quiring their immediate issuance. 4  The purpose of a restraining
31. Mevorah v. Goodman, 65 N.W.2d 278 (N. D. 1954).
32. Strobeck v. McWilliams, 42 N. D. 30, 171 N.W. 865 (1919).
33. N. D. Rev. Code (§ 32-0601, 32-0602, 32-0603 (1943).
34. N. D. Rev. Code § 32-0603 (1943).
35. Burton v. Walker, 13 N. D. 149, 100 N.W. 257 (1904).
36. Dickson v. Dows, 11 N. D. 404, 92 N.W. 797 (1902) (dictum).
37. Forman v. Healy, 11 N. D. 563, 93 N.W. 866 (1903).
38. Security State Bank of Crosby v. Peterson, 59 N. D. 341, 229 N.W. 921 (1930).
39. Ibid.
40. Forman v. Healy, 11 N. D. 563, 93 N.W. 866 (1903) (The court stated that in
oder for the defendant to secure injunctive relief he must bring an independent suit; the
theory being that the remedy was made available exclusively for the protection of the plain-
tiff's rights pending final determination of the case).
41. N. D. Rev. Code § 32-0606 (1943), State v. Simpson, 78 N. D. 360, 49 N.W.2d
777, (1953).
42. N. D. Rev. Code § 32-0607 (1943) provides: "A restraining order, or an order to
show cause in the nature of a restraining order, will not be issued ex parte or without a
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order is to keep matters in the "status quo" until such time as a
determination can be made as to whether or not a temporary in-
junction should be issued. 43 The Supreme Court has held that a
failure to grant a prior hearing is a mere irregularity and cannot be
used as a defense in a criminal contempt proceeding against the
defendant for violating the injunction.4 4 When an injunction pen-
dente lite has been granted without notice the defendant's remedy
is a motion to vacate and until such motion is granted the injunc-
tion remains in full force.4' The defendant may waive an impro-
priety in a temporary or restraining order by failing to move that
it be quashed, by failure to insist on dissolution upon rehearing and
by submission of the whole matter for a trial on the merits.4 ' The
defendant is protected by a statute47 which requires that the plain-
tiff give a written undertaking to indemnify him.4 8 This statute has
also vested in the trial court discretionary power to assess damages
payable to the plaintiff by the defendant. The trial court, in ex-
ercising this discretion, may properly leave the defendant to his
aemedy at law.4' The defendant may attack the injunction with or
without the answer,; ° and if the defendant's application to vacate
is by affidavit the plaintiff may then oppose the same by affidavit or
other proofs in addition to those upon which the injunction was
granted."'
FINAL INJUNCTION
A final injunction may be granted to prevent the breach of an
obligation existing in favor of the applicant: "(1) when pecuniary
compensation would not afford adequate relief; (2) when it would
be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount of compensation
which would afford adequate relief; (3) when restraint is neces-
sary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings; or, (4) when
hearing, unless it shall be shown in the moving papers that there exists such an exigency
or occasion as reqjuires the immediate issuance of an order so that the rights of the parties
may be preserved".
43. Gunsch v. Gunsch, 69 N.W.2d 741 (N. D. 1954).
44. State v. Simpson, 78 N. D. 360, 49 N.W.2d 777 (1953).
45. Ibid.
46. Gunsch v. Gunsch, 69 N.W.2d 741 (N. D. 1954).
47. N. D. Rev. Code § 32-0605 (1943).
48. Murphy v. Swanson, 50 N. D. 788, 198 N.W. 116 (1924).
49. Wolfgram v. Hall, 79 N. D. 138, 54 N.W.2d 896 (1952).
50. N. D. Rev. Code § 32-0609 (1943) provides: "If an injunction is granted by a
pidge of a court without due notice, the defendant . . . may apply . . . , to vacate or
modify the same. The application may be made upon the complaint and the affidavits on
which the injunction was granted or upon affidavits on the part of defendant, with or with-
out the answer."
51. N. D. Rev. Code § 32-0610 (1943) provides: "If the application to vacate an
injunction is made upon affidavits on the part of the defendant, but not otherwise, the
plaintiff may oppose the same hy affidavit or other proofs in addition to those on which the
injunction was granted."
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the obligation arises from a trust."52 After the plaintiff has estab-
lished his legal right and the fact of its violation he is entitled to a
perpetual injunction to prevent recurrance. 5 Where a final injunc-
tion is issued the rights of the parties must have first been deter-
mined and the injunction is then issued in aid of the decree. There
,:re certain situations in which a final injunction cannot be grant-
ed.54, A final injunction may be granted to prevent a breach of con-
tract, only where the contract is one which will be specifically en-
forced.55 An injunction may not be issued to prevent the execution
of a public statute by officers of the law for the public benefit.5 6
The Supreme Court has stated that this will not prevent an injunc-
tion, if the public officer is acting in excess or without authority."
APPEAL
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over injunctions
issuing from the district courts. 58 An order continuing a temporary
injunction after hearing is an appealable order.5 9 When the
Supreme Court reviews the granting of a temporary injunction and
desires to reverse the granting below, it does not dismiss the appeal
but remands the case to the trial court with instructions to dissolve
the temporary injunction. 60 If, during the course of litigation below,
the act complained of has been perfected no injunction can be ob-
tained on appeal6 ' or if the defendant has complied with the in-
junction and removed the obstruction complained of, the injunction
is properly dissolved.2 It is possible to obtain a reversal on appeal
by showing an abuse of discretion .
3
CONCLUSION
Since relief by injunction is equitable in nature and based upon
the discretion of the court, the plaintiff's ability to secure it will
depend upon his -ability to bring himself under some well recog-
52. N. D. Rev. Code § 32-0504 (1943), Strobeck v. McWilliams, 42 N. D. 30, 171
N.W. 865 (1919) (The statute cited here was § 7213 of the Complied Laws of 1913,
which contained the first three provisions of the present statute).
53. Gunsch v. Gunsch, 69 N.W.2d 741 (N. D. 1954).
54. See N. D. Rev. Code § 32-0505 (1943).
55. Mevorah v. Goodman, 65 N.W.2d 278 (N. D. 1954).
56. N. D. Rev. Code J 32-0505 (4) (1943).
57. Viestenz v. Arthur Township, 78 N. D. 1029, 54 N.W.2d 572 (1952).
58. N. D. Rev. Code § 28-2702 (1943).
59. Gillies v. Radke, 78 N. D. 974, 54 N.W.2d 155 (1952).
60. Brace v. Steele County, 77 N. D. 276, 42 N.W.2d 672 (1950).
61. Thompson v. Void, 38 N. D. 569, 165 N.W. 1076 (1917).
62. Brace v. Steele County, 77 N. D. 276, 42 N.W.2d 672 (1950).
63. Compare Bissell v. Olson, 26 N. D. 60, 143 N.W. 340 (1913) (The court said a
mistake of law committed by the trial court was an abuse of discretion); with Sand v.
Peterson, 30 N. D. 171, 152 N.W. 271 (1915) (The court held it was not an abuse of
discretion by the trial court to deny a temporary injunction where the defendants veri-
fled answer positively denied the equity of the complaint).
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nized grounds for equity jurisdiction. 4 The plaintiff must show
that his injury is irreparable and that his remedy at law is inade-
quate. The terms irreparable and inadequate are not capable of a
precise definition, therefore, each case must be decided on its in-
dividual merits. In North Dakota the statutory provisions must al-
ways be kept in mind. " , A study of the cases indicates that a very
strong case of prejudice to the plaintiff's rights must be presented
before the court will grant a temporary injunction or restraining
order ex parte or without a hearing. The effect of issuing a tempo-
rary injunction ex parte is to make the first notice of the action to
the defendant the service of the writ on him. The court's reluctance
to enjoin without notice is understandable. If a clear prima facie
case is established, a temporary restraining order may be obtained
until a hearing can be had on whether a temporary injunction may
issue. Once the plaintiff's rights have been established, a final in-
)unction may issue in aid of the decree.
RAYMOND HAGEN.
COURTS - EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - MANDAMUS I N N o R T H
DAKOTA. - Mandamus is a writ of ancient and obscure origin.' Its
purpose was to prevent a failure of justice by compelling inferior
courts to exercise their ministerial and judicial powers.2 Originally
it was a prerogative writ, issued by the king.3 Later it became a
prerogative of the legislature and finally it vested in the Court of
King's Bench.' It has been defined as "a writ usually issuing out of
the highest court of general jurisdiction in a state, in the name of
the sovereignty, directed to any natural person, corporation or in-
ferior court of judicature within its jurisdiction, requiring them to
do some particular thing therein specified and which pertains to
their office or duty."5 The purpose of the writ as set forth by the
North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 is "to compel the performance
of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled
64. Strobeck v. McWilliams, 42 N. D. 30, 171 N.W. 865 (1919).
65. N. D. Rev. Code c. 32-06 (-943); N. D. Rev. Code c. 32-05 (1943).
1. See High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies 5 (1896).
2. Ibid.
3. Commonwealth ex rel. 'thomas v. Commissioners of Allegheny, 32 Pa. (8 Casey)
218, 223 (1858) (dictumn).
4. Ibid.
5. Bouvier, Law Dictionary (14th ed. 1873).
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